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1. introduction: intent and structure 
of the Hegelian synthesis
Hegel lived in an epoch of upheaval and disso­
lution. As a political individual, who considered 
reading the newspaper as the best way to pray to 
God each morning, he was painfully aware of the 
hopeless fragmentation of the German Reich.1 
And as a thinker, he rejected the dominant phi­
losophies of the age, those of Kant and Fichte, as 
formidable attempts to establish the principle of 
division as the supreme rule for all intellection.1 2 
He behaved with utter intolerance toward the no­
tion that human reason was indeed privileged to 
construct projects for a desired penetration into 
the όντως ον, which, nevertheless, were con­
demned to remain mere «Ideas» * unfulfilled 
yearnings for all eternity. «Our» understanding 
could have no experience of the intelligible. Our 
knowledge was always of the finite. But to Hegel 
this was an outright abdication of philosophical 
responsibility, because it tried to pass as ultimate 
wisdom the self-nullifying proposition that reason 
of necessity poses to itself tasks that it cannot 
hope to execute.3
A new beginning had to be made, a new 
method worked out permitting the restoration of 
unity in thought and action, whose polarities had 
been manipulated by analysis into rigid, implaca­
ble oppositions. Initially, Schelling’s «Indifference» 
seemed to offer this. But eventually Hegel 
became convinced that «Naturphilosophie» had a- 
bandoned conceptual discourse, to become, at 
best, a bacchic celebration of unconscious bliss 
in the dark womb of the Divine, or, at worst, 
confusion in a night in which «all cows are 
black».4
Hegel did embrace the principle of Identity, but 
he proceeded to articulate it as a rigorous system. 
Primordial unity was Spirit, alienating itself into 
finitude, and then recovering itself out of experi­
ence, as restored totality. On this basis Hegel 
would try to reconstitute all the dissolved to­
talities. The best way to characterise Hegelian 
synthesising in a few words would be, following 
R. Kroner, by reference to its undaunted preten­
sions to absolute universality.5
1. Cf. «Die Verfassung Deutschlands» in Hegel, Politische 
Schriften, Frankfurt, 1966, pp. 23-139.
2. The critique essentially completed from a Schellingian 
point of view in the early Jena years with the Differenzschrift 
(1801) and Glauben und Wissen (1802).
3. Eg. Hegel, PhG, tr. Baillie, N.Y., 1967, p. 289.
4. Ibid., p. 79.
5. Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Tubingen, 1961, 
vol. II, p. 261. Also, G. A. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and His­
tory, Cambridge, 1969, p. 302.
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The problem of the inner structure of this 
synthesis now arises. Is there a preponderant 
element providing solid grounding? Immediately 
the claim of all-inclusiveness introduces acute un­
certainty. With a wealth of conflicting emphases, 
various exegeses have been offered as keys to the 
system. On the whole, we can discern, following 
a dichotomy suggested by J. N. Findlay and K. 
Hartmann.1 two schools attempting a metaphysi­
cal and a non-metaphysical interpretation of 
Hegel.
The metaphysical argument claims that the sys­
tem sought to fulfill a religious urge. Philosophy 
was defined by Hegel as conceptual reformulation 
of the teachings of Christianity. Overcoming 
alienation implies healing the deep but artificial 
rift between man and God, as it arose within the 
positivised Church. The logical backbone to the 
system, the triad of abstract universality partic­
ularity-concrete universality, is a philosophical tran­
scription of the Christian mysteries of the Trinity 
and Incarnation. God is the only secure founda­
tion for the universal synthesis.1 2
The non-metaphysical interpretation retorts that 
this «transcription» actually abolished the Chris­
tian meaning of the content borrowed from 
religion.3 In this paper we will pursue and 
evaluate how this line of thought reduced 
Hegelianism to humanism. The reduction, as 
elabourated by Alexandre Kojève,4 rests on a 
brilliant analysis of labour in the PhG* and at­
tempts a new linkage between Hegel and Feuer­
bach and the young Marx. It has become a major 
landmark in Hegelian criticism.
2. a summary of Kojève’s argument
Hegel systematically demolishes the false tran­
scendence of the Christian absolute.5 The God 
of traditional theology is an unreal «abstract 
universal» beyond finite subjectivity. But a 
χωρισμός, an insurmountable cleavage between 
infinity and finitude is a prejudice of analytic
1. J. N. Findlay, «The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel 
and Klaus Hartmann, Hegel: a Non-metaphysical View», in 
Hegel, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. MacIntyre, N.Y., 
1972.
2. R. Kroner, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 240, 262.
Similar views in J. Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel, 2nd Ed., Paris 1951 and H. Niel, De la 
médiation dans la philosophie de Hegel, Paris, 1945.
3. Eg. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Boston, 1968.
4. A. Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Paris, 
1947.
5. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 47, 75, 76, 155, 156. Hegel, PhG,
pp. 763-764.
* Phénoménologie des Geistes
thinking. We must think the μετοχή of empirical 
being in ideality, suppressing the static transcen­
dence of είδος. The Idea descends into empeiria. 
This vision of the Idea’s self-supersession, the 
personalisation of Substance is systematised by 
means of the Aristotelian concepts of δυνάμει 
(potentia, an sich) and ένεργεία (actu, für sich).
The insight into the necessity of the divine’s 
κένωσις6 was possessed by the religion of re­
vealed Spirit, but only as image and sentiment. 
The encrustations of Vorstellung* presented the 
ένανθρώπισις of God as a contingent historical 
event.7 Human autonomy was crushed in the 
presence of an alien God-substance, of Jewish in­
spiration. But the creation of the world is no 
mythology. It is the expression in imagery of the 
rational principle that the Absolute contains in its 
very being its own opposite qua finite world. The 
empirical universe is in God, and God is self­
negation, movement, finite history. Religion is 
human essence projected as a transcendent, dia­
chronic totality.8
God is Man and Man is God. Kojève had no 
hesitation to resolve the extreme ambiguity9 of 
these pronouncements in a definite way. For him, 
no less than for Marcuse,10 it was axiomatic that 
Geist**is the idéogramme or hieroglyph, which, if 
deciphered correctly, yields the laws of finite 
human activity. The metaphysical connotations of 
the term 11 Geist must not be allowed to obscure 
this reduction. Only thus can we do justice to 
Negativity, which is no sport or Schein anchored 
in an intelligible Jenseits, but the core category of 
Hegel’s historical thinking. For only historical 
man is self-transcending confrontation with nature 
and other men.
History is free creative labour. It cannot be 
imprisoned in the straitjacket of some rigidly 
aprioristic scheme. It is essentially open. The 
laws of philosophy are an understanding of what 
is, a backward-looking investigation of the origins 
of the present, and not divine ordinances to be 
fulfilled in the inevitable eschaton. The satisfac­
tion of Science is the contemplation of this open-
6. Hegel, PhG, p. 755.
7. Ibid., pp. 765, 768.
8. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 201-202.
9. Although it figures in G. Lukacs, Der junge Hegel, 
Neuwied and Berlin, 1967, pp. 636-644 for example; the notion 
of a pervasive ambiguity in Hegel was brought out with force­
fulness in H. Niel, op. cit., pp. 214, 251-253, 332, etc.
10. H. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 139.
11. For the problem of the religious connotations of Hegel's 
language, cf. F. Grégoire, Études Hégéliennes, Paris, 1958, 
pp. 212-217.
* Thought by means of representations, objectified images
** Spirit
86
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ness, the rational reconstruction of the systematic 
doubt incessantly performed by historical being 
on itself. It is a rejoicing in the formative genius 
of humanity, which has also accomplished a per­
fect comprehension of its own life.’
The dialectic of social labour constitutes the 
dynamic of this radically historicised existence. 
For Kojève, Hegel’s eternal merit is that, as 
Marx had already acknowledged in 1844,1 2 he was 
the first philosopher to install homo faber as the 
ground of all philosophising.3
Man is need, biological desire. But this ispas­
sive activity, consumption of external matter in 
total dependence to it. It is also a false conquest 
of nature, because the original void perpetually 
reasserts itself.4 We must break out of this vi­
cious circle to gain freedom, which is imposition 
of human meaning on subjugated externality.5 
The environment for this transition is the battle 
for recognition between two men-brutes and the 
resultant stratification into masters and slaves.6 
This is the properly «anthropogenic» situation, in 
which animal desire becomes human because it 
acquires another desire as its object.7 In the 
well-known inversion, the master self-destructs, 
as an indolent being, an «existential impasse». 
Only the slave achieves humanity. Fear liquefies 
the fixed determinants of the slave’s being, and 
labour educates him in freedom: by producing he 
grasps himself as determining externality. A first 
abstract consciousness of freedom emerges. The 
slave becomes a stoic, while the master vege­
tates, destined to die out eventually.8
For Kojève, history is from now on the process 
of concretising the abstract freedom won by the 
slave, ultimately in the shape of a political order 
of universal equality.9 But before this is 
achieved, a series of «strategies of retreat» will 
intervene, pretended redemptions in thought that 
leave the social reality of slavery intact. Supreme 
among such fictitious liberations is Christianity.10 
Genuine freedom can come only by the abolition 
of the last form of slavery, bourgeois society, and 
its Christian ideology. This was accomplished in 
the French Revolution, the final revolt of the 
slaves against the masters and the triumph of
1. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 300-302.
2. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, N.Y., 
1973, p.177.
3. Kojève, op. cit., P· 217 among numerous other refer­
ences.
4. Ibid., p. 168.
5. Ibid., p. 13.
6. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
7. Ibid., pp. 12, 14.
8. Ibid., pp. 15-34.
9. Ibid., p. 172.
10. Ibid., pp. 180, 181-182.
equality and atheism.11 When Napoleon finally trans­
lates the ideals of the French Revolution into a new 
institutional order, Hegel sees this, according to 
Kojève, as the realisation of the«homogeneous and 
universal»12 state of objective freedom, the telos of 
history.13
Napoleon establishes the political conditions for 
the full blossoming of atheist, creative humanity. 
Hegel is the consciousness of this achievement, 
he comprehends this perfect reality from the 
standpoint of the Weltgeist. Hegel’s absolute 
philosophy is the conceptualisation of the new ra­
tional order.14 The definitive Befriedigung* of 
historical man is, in fine, in the free pursuit of 
selfdevelopment in the Napoleonic state, and in 
the consciousness of this his concrete freedom 
through the principles of Hegelianism.
3. Hegel’s history and Kojève’s reduction
Kojève’s reduction is based on a special read­
ing of the PhG alone. Based on this exclusive 
emphasis Kojève claims that for Hegel the 
Napoleonic Empire is the consummation of his­
tory.
It is well-known that in 1806, the year of the 
PhG, Hegel believed that under the leadership of 
Napoleon a rational reorganisation of the world 
was in process.15This conviction reflected an ob­
jective truth, namely that at the time Napoleon 
was in fact the principal agent of historical prog­
ress. His push for world domination was expe­
diting throughout Europe the collapse of decadent 
feudal holdovers.
And yet, it would be inaccurate to claim that the 
mood of intense expectation for political change 
is the dominant element in Hegel's thought in 
1806, and equally after the collapse of Napoleon’s 
adventure.
Hegel was interested in Napoleon only to the 
extent that his schemes could be integrated in the 
march of the Weltgeist, the progress of freedom. 
In this light the changes he wrought, affirming 
freedom within an objective order, were perma­
nent conquests of the human spirit. It was this a 
priori of objective freedom that Hegel never re­
nounced.
But it is arbitrary to conclude from this either 
that Hegel saw his ideal free state realised in 
Napoleon’s Empire; or that this ideal was based
11. Ibid., p. 183.
12. Ibid., pp. 289, 145 among numerous other references.
13. Ibid., pp. 194-195 among numerous other references.
14. Ibid., p. 153 among numerous other references.
15. G. Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 555-556.
* Satisfaction
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on the principle of equality and atheism; or, fi­
nally, even if we concede that for a moment he 
saw in the Empire the highest expression of free­
dom in the world, he stuck to this view after its 
collapse.
On the contrary, we know that Hegel’s mature 
conception of the state depicts a severely hier­
archical structure, with an important role played 
by religion and the Church. And it is patterned 
not on Napoleon’s state but on the Prussia of 
the Stein-Hardenberg reforms.1
The shift away from a profound, yet of neces­
sity temporary, allegiance to Napoleon can be 
corroborated by reference to the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, that Hegel pronounced in 
Berlin after 1818. They express his mature vision 
of history. The important point here is that, in 
comparison to the PhG, the significance of the 
French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath 
has perceptibly receded.1 2 It does not any more 
represent the decisive turning point in modern 
history. The great event that launches the final 
drive of Reason for definitive triumph is now the 
German Reformation,3 which reaffirmed the infi­
nite value of subjectivity to break the stranglehold 
of the positive church. The French Revolution 
failed because the French soul had not managed 
to shake off the shackles of Catholicism before it 
undertook to demolish the political order.4 The 
real earth-shaking revolution will occur in Ger­
many. It will be the spiritual revolution culminat­
ing in Hegelianism, which builds on Luther’s in­
sights. The Weltgeist has migrated from France 
and political objectivity to Germany and philo­
sophical subjectivity. The same movement is 
foreshadowed in the PhG as well.
Napoleon is not any more the principal agent of 
spiritual progress. Rather, three other world- 
historical individuals, whose vocation was at the 
antipodes of Napoleon’s worldly undertaking, 
predominate. All three represent the irruption of 
the subjective principle into closed «natural» 
syntheses to explode their objectivised limited­
ness. They are: Socrates, whose affirmation of 
subjective freedom disrupts the custom-based 
harmony of the Polis, registering the fact of its 
incipient decomposition; Christ, who manifestly 
unites an alien God-object with finite subjectivity; 
and, as we would expect, Luther.5
1. Ibid., pp. 557, 620. Also S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of 
the Modern State, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 63, 67, 70.
2. G. Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 561-562.
3. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, N.Y., 1900, pp. 
412-438.
4. Ibid., pp. 444, 445, 447, 453.
5. Ibid., pp. 267-271: on Socrates; pp. 318-326; On Christ;
pp. 414-418: on Luther.
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Consequently, it becomes evident from the out­
set that Hegel’s rational schématisation of history 
purported to account for the triumph of subjecti­
vity and spirituality in a processually unified cos­
mos.
But, could it be that the «mature view» is a 
degeneration of original insights under the impact 
of steadily growing uncritical conservatism? Could 
Kojève’s emphasis on the French Revolution and 
Napoleon, although not valid for the system as a 
whole, reflect the spirit of an earlier, more 
«progressive» phase in Hegel’s thought?
We must answer in the negative. At no time in 
Hegel’s development was the telos of history de­
fined in political terms. Paradoxically, this applies 
particularly to the most Napoleonic phase of his 
thought. A synoptic evaluation of the PhG proves 
that a primacy of the political moment, whose es­
sence is labour, is an exaggeration. On the whole, 
the primacy of the ideal moment is already estab­
lished by 1806, and it will remain an unchanged 
assumption throughout.
Kojève’s key claim is that in the PhG philo­
sophy and religion are conceived as ideological 
superstructures determined by the concrete his­
torical existence of the organised human commu­
nity, the Volk.6* It is instructive to note that the 
textual evidence produced to back this view does 
not come from the PhG, but from an earlier text. 
No wonder. For, first of all, the political moment 
as conceived and analysed by the mature Hegel is 
absent. Social morality, as the reconciliation 
within the framework of a constitutional monar­
chy of the various private and social aspects of 
human life (property, conscience, family, class, 
economic activity, political representation, etc.), 
simply does not figure. Further, the shape of the 
Ethical Order (Sittlichkeit) with a different con­
tent, that does appear is ultimately superseded in 
the PhG by Morality, reversing the sequence of 
the 1821 PhG (Philosophy of Right).1
Admittedly, we would expect, in an itinerary of 
consciousness, the socio-political background to 
be refracted through the prism of subjective doxa 
on its way to perfect aletheia. But, even allowing 
for this distortion, we would still demand frag­
ments of subjective impressions somehow corre­
sponding with an objective reality exhibiting He­
gelian articulation (estates, corporation, etc.). But 
in the PhG a post-revolutionary political ordf ■· is 
not reflected. We will see later why.
6. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 197-201, 289. Quotation referr-d to 
in next sentence, pp. 201-202.
7. Compare PhG, pp. 466-679, from «Sittlichkeit» to 
«Moralität»; with PhG, Frankfurt, 1970, pp. 203-503, from 
«Moralität» to «Sittlichkeit».
* People, Nation.
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In this connection it interests us to note that 
the «Sittlichkeit» of the PhG refers totally and ex­
clusively to the « unreflected», customary har­
mony of the Polis.1 The only division here is the 
differentiation between a divine of chthonic law, 
defended by woman,2 and the law of the state, 
upheld by man.3 This is the direct appropriation 
of the Antigone for philosophy, the poetic conflict 
conceptualised, absolutised. Hegel’s idealistic 
procedure is well in evidence here: the structure 
of the social background is deduced from an ideal 
division. The opposition in the sphere of Law is 
emphatically non-reducible to any social base. On 
the contrary, social cleavage is accounted for 
through ideal conditions. In any case, we are lit­
erally worlds apart from modem socio-economic 
articulation.
Even more momentous is the manner in which 
«Sittlichkeit» is superseded in the PhG. After a 
long procession of dirempted worlds the dialectic 
culminates in Kantian Moralität.4
One of the intermediate forms, whose truth is 
Kantian freedom of conscience, is the French 
Revolution, alleged by Kojève to signal the escha- 
ton in Hegelian history. In the French Revolution 
Kojève’s Hegel sees the definitive act of human 
social and spiritual liberation. It is the revolt of 
the slaves against the masters that finally 
abolishes mastery, and hence slavery too. It is 
the advent of equality in a society of free atheist 
individuals.5
But here Kojève is imposing on Hegel an alien 
inspiration. The French Revolution as it unfolds 
in the PhG is the consequence of no class con­
flict. Masters and slaves as constituted social 
groups battling for possession of the means of 
production are absent. Consequently, the capture 
of political power by a class, which, in order to 
free itself from exploitation, must proceed to lib­
erate humanity as a whole, is equally a fiction.
For Hegel the French Revolution is not a social 
but a spiritual event; no class rebellion, but the 
outcome of the rage and fury of abstract, at­
omised self-consciousness proceeding to impose 
on the world, which it wants for itself, its arbi­
trary, unlimited, violent will.6 This is the nega­
tive freedom of the Enlightenment in action. The 
objective socio-political environment is perceived 
by the self-centered individuality as a fetter it has 
to demolish. No institution survives. The old
. 1. Hegel, PhG, pp. 466-499.
2. Ibid., p. 476.
3. Ibid., p. 478.
4. Ibid., pp. 613-627.
5. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 113, 183.
6. Hegel, PhG, p. 604.
order is pulverised, and society is reduced to a 
quantitative aggregation of mutually exclusive 
atoms.
But in its paroxysm of destruction negative 
freedom produces death and no new life. No 
single, unified class accedes to power, but only 
factions, fortuitous and momentary conspiracies 
of self-seeking individuals, clashing with one 
another for purely particular ends.7 This is a 
reign of terror and total anarchy. The old order 
has been subverted, but its place taken by an 
immense chasm that cannot be filled by the 
thousands of heads rolling off the guillotine like 
split cabbages.8 This is no ideal for reason. It, 
rather, condemns the spectacle with horror, be­
cause it recognises freedom only within an objec­
tive context. Negative freedom can only obliterate 
a moribund world, but cannot deliver the new 
one. Consciousness will seek a higher principle to 
reunify the pulverised universe.
It finds it in its own subjectivity. Abstract free­
dom failed to objectify itself. Consciousness now 
recoils from objectivity and absorbs the cosmos 
in its punctiform atomicity. It becomes moral 
conscience, the self-certainty of subject knowing 
itself as universal.9 This was the great teaching 
of Kant. By embracing it we leave France be­
hind. Spirit migrates to a new land, the land of 
thought, Germany.10
It is the inner dialectic of the Kantian «moral 
view of the world», culminating in the profound 
Yea-saying of Forgiveness (Verzeihungj,11 and not 
some terrestrial paradise, just exposed as a mis­
erable failure, that ushers in the era of the finite 
spirit’s unity with the absolute, initially in the 
medium of faith.20
Not that Kantianism as it stands is the accom­
plished reconciliation. On the contrary, it has to 
undergo extensive transformation before the 
wounds of diremption are healed.13 Kant started 
well on this road with his «transcendental unity 
of apperception», but because he refused to sac­
rifice the «Ding-an-sich», his «intellectus arche- 
typus» remained a mere «Idea». Only Hegel’s u- 
nification of substantiality and subjectivity14 will de­
finitively respond to the profound yearning of 
contemporary Bildung for a totalising view of the 
cosmos.15
7. Ibid., p. 605.
8. Ibid., pp. 605-606.
9. Ibid., pp. 613-614.
10. Ibid., p. 610.
11. Ibid., pp. 677, 679.
12. Ibid., pp. 685-694. Also G. Lukacs, op. cit., p. 595.
13. The insights of 1801-1802 incorporated in the PhG: pp. 
190-193 , 440-453 for instance.
14. Ibid., p. 80.
15. Hegel, Differenzschrift, Frankfurt, 1970, pp. 20, 22.
89
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Thus, the ideal trajectory beyond political ob­
jectivity has already been described in the PhG, 
despite Kojève’s insistence to the contrary. But 
equally important is another fact, which he also 
chooses to neglect, namely that as yet in 1806 
this prospect of salvation in the restored unity of 
thought is in no position to point to any objective 
background—and that includes Napoleon’s state 
—as its corresponding political framework.
Not that the demand for objectivity is absent; it 
constitutes an essential aspect of Hegel’s method. 
But, for the time being, it can be no more than 
this, a mere demand, pure unfulfilled Ought 
(Sollen).1 Why? Because, as we saw above, the 
French Revolution destroyed, but did not create. 
Napoleon gave the upheaval pan-European di­
mensions. But his enterprise was still in its for­
mative stage and had produced no permanent in­
stitutionalisation. The war between the old and 
the new in Europe was still raging. No objective 
order of freedom had congealed, to which Hegel 
could attach himself definitely and unequivocally. 
Certainly, there were signs (the Code Napoleon, 
for instance) that the reality which might emerge 
out of the turmoil stood a good chance of con­
forming to the standards of the new rationality. 
But these were statements of intent, rather than 
objective crystallisations.1A
Consequently, it is claiming too much to sug­
gest that the Hegel of the PhG found in the still 
fluid Napoleonic reality the eternal paradigm of 
concrete freedom. On the political level, the PhG 
is characterised more by the silence of ambiguity, 
than by the firmness of commitment. It stands at 
mid-point between two worlds, decadent pre­
revolution France, which died a deserved death, 
and the future community of universal recogni­
tion, which has not yet come into existence.
The only certainty is in the realm of thought. 
Whatever happens in politics, salvation proceeds 
from a revolution in philosophy. Admittedly, the 
dialectical method requires that the synthesis
I. Hegel, PhG,p. 607. We need a reconstitution of the dis­
solved spheres, a new institutionalisation. But Hegel here 
could only conceive of this as a return to the past and a re­
petition of the «cycle of necessity» culminating in the revolu­
tion. An objective order as an immediate prospect is not 
countenanced, although its need is deeply felt. Inwardness is 
the only way out.
1A. On Napoleon: «He, then, with the vast might of his 
character turned his attention to foreign relations, subjected all 
Europe, and diffused his liberal institutions in every quarter. 
Greater victories were never gained, expeditions displaying 
greater genius were never conducted: but never was the poW- 
erlessness of victory exhibited in a clearer light than then. The 
disposition of the peoples, i.e. their religious disposition and 
that of their nationality, ultimately precipitated that 
colossus;...», Philosophy of History, p. 451.
must ultimately acquire a social ground. But the 
concern with objectivity in no way expresses a 
belief in Hegel that a political infra-structure con­
ditions the ideal systematisation. The principles 
for the synthesis have, already been posited in 
1806, long before reformed Prussia was finally 
seized upon as the needed foothold in objectivity. 
In any event, the PhG lacks any such firm sup­
port.
It was Gyorgy Lukacs who laid stress on this 
lack of social connection. Hegel’s flight into 
idealism, his conviction that the sheer power of 
the German spiritual Schwung could alone recon­
stitute the unities lying broken like gaping wounds 
on the battlefields of the world, appeared to him 
particularly empty, precisely because it corre­
sponded to no political reality, German or other­
wise. He dubbed it, therefore, «Hegel’s German 
Utopia».2
This «utopian» element is significantly accen­
tuated because in the PhG the first momentous 
methodological break-through towards the ulti­
mate ideal reconciliation has just occurred. The 
Preface exudes the intense excitement of the 
thinker who has just opened his wings to soar in 
the crystalline ether of Spirit and the whole land­
scape of reason, as a vast but perfectly consti­
tuted totality, is beginning to take shape under his 
very eyes. The system has not, of course, been 
completed yet. The PhG is only an «Introduc­
tion» to Science. But its basis has been laid out; 
it is the identity of substance and subject.
Hegel is here under the impact of the joy of 
first discovery, of the breathtaking realisation that 
at last the principle of universal synthesis has 
been won. There is no celebration of mundane 
state structures here; only rupture and amazement 
at the prodigious power of Reason energising the 
finite mind. The impetuous rush to complete in 
one fell swoop, if possible, the assimilation of the 
totality of life, the flushed stubborness to under­
take a tortuous ascent to the supreme peak of ra­
tionality, this is the elemental impulse permeating 
the PhG, the force that shapes the roughness of 
its texture. Gushing forth like a flood of concepts 
and feelings it betrays the profound agitation of a 
young mind, which believes it has just solved the 
riddle of the universe!
The ecstatic fervour will reach its peaks of en­
thusiasm in the emotional ending of the PhG,3 
which, despite Kojève’s attempt to prove that 
Hegel’s habitual misquotations imply that the 
lines from Schiller are meant as a celebration of
2. G. Lukacs, op cit., p. 618.
3. Hegel, PhG, p. 808.
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human empirical existence,1 constitutes an al­
most mystical1 2 glorification of the awsome power 
of reason to defeat finitude.
The demand for the aposteriorisation of the a 
priori, to use again the words of R. Kroner, will 
be more adequately dealt with later, when, after 
the collapse of Napoleon’s empire, the landscape 
of Europe solidifies into new, more or less stable 
political arrangements. The iron logic of history 
has now disposed of the claims of the Napoleonic 
state to represent the fulfilment of rationality. The 
Weltgeist is now ready to migrate to a new land 
politically as well as philosophically. The 
«utopian» vision of 1806 can now be referred to a 
concrete social entity, the land of thought can 
now be correlated with an existent German state, 
Prussia.
Hegel’s newfound loyalty for Prussia certainly 
signals a retreat from the revolutionary expecta­
tions of earlier, more unsettled years. And yet, as 
G. Lukacs has shown, despite a growing conser­
vatism, in the strict sense that a given objective 
structure is now accepted as the possible social 
basis of freedom, and, as we might add, in a way 
because of it, as Hegel now possesses tangible 
empirical material to base his generalisations on, 
his grasp of the conflicts and cleavages forming 
the social content of emerging industrial Europe 
becomes sharp and realistic, his analysis of trends 
incisive, clearly anticipating the later Marxian 
critique of bourgeois society.3 The insights on 
the function of the market and alienated labour in 
contemporary capitalism, developed in the years 
1803-1806, which were significantly ignored in the 
PhG, are only now (PhR, 1821) reappropriated 
within a political framework with definite objec­
tive references.4
But (conservatism has nothing to do in Hegel’s 
case with servile adulation of a status quo. He 
became convinced that the ambitious programme 
of social reform in Prussia could be the starting 
point for further progress.5 Prussia was a 
dynamic reality, certainly in need for improve­
ment, yet a paradigm for rationality in politics, 
because she allegedly recognised freedom of the 
individual within an institutional structure based 
on law. It was again from the standpoint of 
reason and freedom, that Hegel approached the 
Prussian experience as a possible objective 
ground for his ideal state. This later empirical
1. Kqjève, op. cit., p. 440.
2. G. Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 626, 632, 640, 652, 667-668.
3. Ibid., p. 568.
4. Compare Jenaer Realphilosophie (1805-6), Hamburg, 
1969, pp. 213-221, and PhR, Frankfurt, 1970, pp. 346-360.
5. Avineri, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
orientation amends to a significant degree the 
flight into pure thought of 1806, that so offended 
Lukacs. But it would be unwarranted to claim 
that it subverts the sovereignty of the ideal as es­
tablished in the PhG, as some were tempted to 
assert by totally isolating the PhG from its overall 
philosophical context.6
The demand for empirical instantiation is a cen­
tral aspect of the Hegelian method that synthe­
sises thought and being under conditions of a 
primacy of thought. Just because by 1821 the abso­
lute System has isolated a sociopolitical back­
ground, exhibiting encouraging tendencies for 
transforming itself into the rationally demanded 
real framework for the full blossoming of 
Hegelian man, philosophy does not forfeit its 
dominance.
The state is necessary and rational only to the 
extent that it performs the linkage between raw 
particularity and the universal, i.e. as a basis for 
higher spirituality. If would be an anachronism to 
impute to this conception the Marxian relation of 
determination of a superstructure by a social 
infra-structure. Philosophy is its time apprehended 
in thoughts in the precise Hegelian sense of re­
vealing to what degree the Absolute has acquired 
an adequate objective expression at a particular 
moment in history. What is actual is indeed ra­
tional, but it is only the Idea that identifies what 
is reality «in the emphatic sense» (Wirklichkeit) as 
opposed to contingent Realität which should be 
disregarded.7 Philosophy must be seen, there­
fore, as a rigorous critique of what is from the 
standpoint of reason, even though the most deca­
dent, irrational reality does contain the hidden 
seeds for a superior truth.8 The state is
«divine» not as an end in itself, the Moloch to 
which the individual must be sacrificed, but only 
as a moment, alongside other equally divine mo­
ments, in the eschatology of absolute knowledge 
governing history. It is the most perfect, all- 
inclusive objective structure, upholding the free­
dom of the individual, so that he may achieve the 
fullest comprehension of his self in this
freedom.9
6. E.G. Eric Weil, Hegel et l'état, Paris 1950. On this see 
Kelly, op. cit., pp. 293-294, 323.
7. Hegel, PhR, pp. 24,25.
8. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. Il, Frankfurt, 1969, 
p. 465, where the possibility of an empirical state not in con­
formity with reason is explicitly recognised. Also Kelly, 
op.cit., pp. 332, 333. «Hegel’s is a Gedanken Staat», hence it 
can conceivably conflict with irrational Realität. Also in Kelly, 
p. 323: «Nothing indeed is in its way more radical than 
Hegel’s notion of reason».
9. Grégoire, op. cit., pp. 331-333, 240-247. Kelly, op. cit., 
p. 328.
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The argument up to this point has shown, I 
hope, that Kojève has performed a number of in­
genious transpositions to found his claim that in 
the PhG, as well as in the competed system, 
Hegel puts forth a particular political reality 
based on liberated labour, and a philosophy de­
termined by it, as the telos of history. Even if 
this were true of the PhG individually, its validity 
for the mature synthesis would not automatically 
follow. But as we saw, the «utopian» flight of 
1806 disproves the claim as it relates to the PhG 
as well. By 1821 the celebration of pure thought 
has been tempered by empirical reference, but 
this is a demand internal to Hegel’s idealism and 
does not disturb the primacy of absolute over ob­
jective spirit.
Besides, even if it did the reduction would re­
semble much more reformed Prussia, than 
Napoleon’s alleged «homogeneous and universal» 
empire.
4. empiricism and its «truth»
To back his objectivistic slant Kojève attempts 
a reinterpretation of Hegel’s method too. His 
thesis is that this method is «phenomenological 
description», further equated with empiricism and 
positivism.1 The dialectic is no method, because 
the latter strictly defined is a set of rules heuristi- 
cally posited in severance from the object to be 
dissected. The dialectic, on the contrary, asserts 
the implicit identity of thought and its content. 
For it, thought is not a set of formal rules of ex­
clusively subjective validity, but submersion into 
being, description of its inner life, an imitation, a 
registration of determining objective tendencies.1 2
Is this ingenious attempt to portray an «emp- 
piricist» Hegel tenable?
This reduction starts from a correct identifica­
tion of the logical core of Hegelianism, the as­
sumption of unity of thought and being. It also 
rightly points out that if we adhere to an every­
day acceptation .of «method» and logic, as ab­
straction from content, then obviously dialectics 
is not this sort of method; it is also illogical. 
Hegel has argued extensively against the separa­
tion of subject from object.3 But he has also ar­
gued for a higher rationality (dialectics is illogical 
for Understanding) on the assumption of identity. 
Would the ordinary empiricist feel at home in this 
assumption? Can the constraints of the scientific
1. Kojève, op. cit., pp. 447, 451.
2. Ibid., p. 446.
3. The most concise argument in PhG, pp. 111-115.
method square with the Hegelian a priori? Not so 
easily.
From the standpoint of a higher criticism, the 
empiricist’s inability to accept original identity, as 
unwarranted metaphysical extrapolation, appears 
as «ηscientific self-contradicting stubbomess. On 
the one hand, he demands that the tools of the 
mind be kept in total severance from the world 
«out there». On the other, as soon as he has ut­
tered this,.he proceeds to annihilate its validity in 
practice; he executes projects, based on the ab­
stract conception of method, which are supposed 
to fully expose the inner structure of the very 
being assumed as external to reason. But this 
total interpenetration cannot occur if a radical 
cleavage separates mind from objectivity.
It is illogical to claim that the coincidence of 
thought and object, accepted in practice by em­
pirical science itself, must be perceived only as a 
result, a conclusion of unity built on the premises 
of strict separation. Unity qua result can originate 
only with an imlicit identity, which appears as 
total division to phenomenal consciousness.
The empiricist has the privilege to refuse to 
make this necessary backward inference. He be­
gins in médias res and accepts the Entzweiung* at 
hand as the ultimate fact. Subjectively, he may 
even feel quite satisfied in this contradiction. But, 
strictly considered, if he makes this choice, he 
has to accept either one of two equally unaccept­
able corollaries: either science, as of mere subjec­
tive validity, cannot produce true knowledge of 
objective being as it is in itself; or, if it does pro­
duce knowledge, then how it is achieved must 
remain a mystery.
As far as philosophy is concerned, this con­
tradiction, which actually undermines science in­
stead of securing it from the encroachments of 
metaphysics, must be lifted. A «higher
comment»4 on empiricism does not deny the real­
ity of the accomplishments of science, which are 
considered as a most valuable expression of 
man’s inherent drive to humanise nature,5 but 
provides it with a solid theoretical underpinning, 
within the overall synthetic scheme.
Hegelianism cannot be without further ado 
identified with empiricism. We must add the all- 
important specification that dialectics is the truth 
of empiricism, it is true or genuine empiricism, in 
so far as it takes the plunge into being, healing 
the Trennung** and uncovering empiricism’s im­
plicit foundations. Hence, it is equally the aboli-
4. Findlay, op. cit., p. 4.
5. Science as a necessary tool for subjugating nature: cf. ch. 
on «observing reason» in PhG, pp. 281-372.
* Division
** Separation
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tion of what we ordinarily understand as 
empiricism.1
Can we reasonably expect the empiricist him­
self to acquiesce in this his own Aufhebung? To 
him scientific praxis is all that matters. He is not 
subjectively aware of any contradiction in his 
situation, and the Hegelian attempt to point one 
out is dismissed as irrelevant metaphysics.
Paradoxically it was Kojève himself who bril­
liantly demonstrated that it is not at all necessary 
that an individual operating on the level of Un­
derstanding (or, for that matter, within the limits 
of any other partial viewpoint) perceive his thus 
confined existence as torn by intolerable con­
tradiction. Further, he is under no obligation to 
seek liberation, in case he does experience inner 
conflict, in thought. Finally, even if he hopes for 
salvation in some form of self-consciousness, the 
adoption of Hegel’s absolute standpoint is not 
inevitable.1 2
Hegel assumes a priori the necessity for a re­
lentless ascent from the lowest forms of self- 
awareness all the way to the final synthesis of 
absolute idealism. But again it was Kojève who 
showed that this assumption is shared only by a 
restricted group of philosophers, who accept 
thought, in its dynamic universalisation, as the 
proper medium of a necessary reconciliation.3 It 
does not apply to those, for example, who es­
pouse the predominance of the irrational in 
human nature; or to those who seek fulfilment in 
non-philosophical pursuits (politics, art, business, 
etc.), understood as limited by dialectics, but not 
by the participants themselves.
There is no guarantee that a «higher comment» 
on these partial forms from the outside will cause 
their disintegration, by unveiling contradictions 
which the limited subjects themselves do not ex­
perience. But further, there is no necessity either 
why these subjects should acknowledge precisely 
such limitations in their existence as Hegel pro­
fesses to discern.4
1. Cf. the polemic against mathematics in PhG, pp. 100-105; 
the argument for philosophy’s determining superiority vis-a-vis 
the empirical sciences in PhG, p. 125. Also PhG, p. 115: 
«This nature of scientific method, which consists partly in 
being inseparable from content, and partly in determining the 
rhythm of its movement by its own agency, finds, as we men­
tioned before, its peculiar systematic expression in speculative 
philosophy» (emphasis added). This clearly sets Hegel apart 
from ordinary empiricism.
See also: Kroner, op. cit., 'vol. II, pp. 241-253, ch. on 
«Empirie und Spekulation in der Philosophie des Geistes»; 
and E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, pp. 109-117, ch. on «Hegel and 
Empiricism».
2. Kojève, op. cit., p. 286.
3. Ibid., p. 279.
4. Ibid., p. 277.
Surprisingly, these very effective criticisms lev­
elled by Kojève against the notion of a strict pro­
gression from «lower» to «higher» forms of con­
sciousness can be turned against his own identifi­
cation of Hegelianism and empiricism. In this he 
is practising the same procedure he criticised in 
Hegel, because he claims a necessary adoption of 
the dialectical position by the «lower» standpoint.
And yet, an unreconciled, and indeed unrecon- 
cilable, discrepancy between relative and absolute 
points of view, an essential pluralism of attitudes 
must be granted, even if one admits that only 
some form of «synoptic dialectic», to use Plato’s 
terms, can best achieve the unification of the 
human experience.
The dialectician may be capable of placing the 
empiricist in a universal scheme, but the latter is 
in no way obligated to acknowledge the place­
ment, and its particular form, as the former’s 
right.
5. the inner structure of the Hegelian synthesis
The assertion of a primacy of the objective 
moment in Hegel led Kojève to the identification 
of the phenomenological with the empirical 
method. To demonstrate it, he referred abstractly 
and in general terms to the original unity of 
subject-object, called, quite correctly, the heart of 
the dialectical vision of the universe. He has 
avoided to investigate the inner structure of that 
unity, to search for the dominant element provid­
ing the environment for the totalisation. But, lack 
of explicit reference to the problem of structure, 
which seems to imply that such a problem is not 
even recognised, does not deter Kojève from of­
fering his own solution. The humanist reduction is 
self-evident truth and the arguments against it 
simply ignored.
The objective pole is tom away from its subjec­
tive counterpart and posited as the quintessence 
of the synthesis. Kojève is categorical that in 
Hegel thought is defined as an imitation of being, 
that philosophy is conditioned by the rhythm of 
the objective movement, that Spirit is historical 
man struggling to perfect his existence in the 
world through labour.
But Hegel also insisted that thought is capable 
of following the object because being is essen­
tially thought, because the world in-itself (an-sich) 
is rational articulation, a structure of objectivised, 
materialised and socialised, concepts.5 The mate­
rial universe is no hard rock on which thought’s 
universalistic pretensions are shattered. To the
5. The self-identity of being is pure abstraction, hence 
thought; cf. PhG, p. 113.
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contrary, the object cannot, in the final analysis, 
offer successful resistance to the onslaught of the 
Idea, whose determination to find itself in matter 
cannot be frustrated.1 This occurs not because 
the object is a dream, an unreality, but because 
this fundamental impulse of the Idea coincides 
with the inherent destiny and desire of matter it­
self, its self-determination to become rationalised. 
Hence we cannot refer exclusively to a materiali­
sation of thought demanded by Hegel. This asser­
tion must be accompanied by the correlative 
proposition that materialisation is possible only 
because matter has been previously profoundly 
spiritualised; the empirical universe has been de­
fined as manifestation of a rational «an sich», 
comprehended as moment in the dynamic self- 
propelled unfolding of reason.
Again, what is actual is rational, thought re­
quires an objective basis, empirical instantiation. 
But precisely what is actual, which objective 
order is worthy to function as the real instance of 
reason, this is determined by reason itself. The 
Idea scrutinises the finite given and a priori 
selects the configurations corresponding to the 
ideal needs of its self-supersession.1 2
As Klaus Hartmann has suggested, the 
«minimal» claim that ought to be advanced is that 
in the synthesis being figures only to the extent 
that if is thought being; objectivity amenable to 
totalisation is only that which can be penetrated 
by the concept. All reality that could be imagined 
as inaccessible to thought is disregarded.3
This procedure is quite glaring in Hegel’s ap­
proach to nature. The most that reason can 
achieve in this the most empirical of objective 
realms is an //«perfect instantiation of the a priori 
of unity, in the throes of rampant contingency 
that spirit cannot claim absolutely.4 Hence, 
philosophy is here satisfied to sketch the vague 
contours of the concept, to somehow guess its 
presence. It adopts an aporetic posture vis-a-vis 
non-assimilable irrationality. This stubborn resis­
tance of nature to the universalistic aspirations of 
Hegelian reason is the origin of Hegel’s deep con­
tempt for it, as the point of greatest distance from 
‘Spirit. But this resentment is equally a confession
1. Ibid., p. 145.
2. Hegel, Logik, vol. II, p. 464.
3. Hartmann, op. cit., pp. 103-104. It is a different question 
whether a «maximal» claim is also legitimate, i.e. a full-scale 
metaphysisation of the system. Hartmann himself, p. 117, that 
a non-metaphysical logical interpretation is adequate, although 
he does not dismiss out of hand the «maximal» claim (p. 123). 
But for Kroner, op. cit., vol. II, p. 302, Hegel did not logicise 
the cosmos, but spiritualised logic. This debate belongs to a 
discussion of the metaphysical argument as such. What is of 
relevance here is that both reject the reduction to labour.
4. Hegel, PhG, pp. 324-327.
of impotence to tame this harshest expression of 
finitude, the point at which the elimination of re­
calcitrant facts becomes somewhat vexatious 
philosophically, as the rigid scheme comes up 
against a limit. But this is a momentary discom­
fort, thought cannot be dragged down by it. It 
quickly moves forward by turning its back on 
phenomena that do not lend themselves to con­
ceptualisation. The process of «selection» reas­
serts itself, the same one practiced in the superior 
realm of politics, only there with more finesse 
and convoluted subtlety.
It becomes clear, therefore, that the actualisa­
tion of thought (thought is being) cannot be con­
ceived independently, from, but only within the 
framework of spiritualised objectivity (being is 
thought). This latter thesis is not merely coordi­
nated with the former, juxtaposed to it; they are 
not both posited in one breath so that they are 
annulled reciprocally, and the outcome is a big 
zero. Thought is given a material basis only on 
condition that reason should purify the object 
from contingency. Within the synthesis reason is 
the dominant element. Hegel does in fact unify 
thought and being, but in, by and for thought.5
This is the meaning of Hegel’s dictum that «all 
philosophy is idealism».6 Philosophy, by virtue of 
the simple fact of being a thought reconstruction 
of the foundations of reality is ipso facto idealis­
tic, even if it attributes ultimate truth to so-called 
material principles. Air, water, the void, not to 
speak of pure matter, represent just differing de­
grees of abstraction from tangible finitude pur­
porting to express the essential in all empirical 
existence.7 Hegel was the first to formulate the 
conditions under which philosophy would be able 
to fully accomplish its idealistic vocation, i.e. 
achieve a perfect penetration of the absolute. 
Idealism became absolute with Hegel.
Since this new idealism is discourse about the 
inner logic of είναι, and the είναι of logos, hence 
an onto-logy, it does not conceive the ideal as 
lack of objectivity, transcendent void beyond the 
finite universe; It does not imply either that a 
thought creates the world ex nihilo, that objectiv­
ity is an illusion, a state of mind. In the original 
thought-based unity subject and object are both 
real. They become fused because dialectical criti­
cism reveals that they cannot achieve genuine, ra­
tional reality in mutually exclusive isolation. Their 
reality is' in and through one another: the positing 
of Sein is ipso facto the positing of conscious-
5. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 301, 309-312.
6. Hegel, Logik, vol. I, p. 172.
7. Ibid., p. 172.
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ness, because Sein is essential abstraction from 
all determination.1
To the extent that the a priori unity is moved 
by the inherent necessity to transcend its abstract 
immediacy and unfold the wealth of its implicit 
determinations qua empirical history it is Spirit. It 
is the abstract logic of universal dynamic inter­
connection in the process of assimilating the ob­
jective moment; Spirit is descent into finitude and 
the appropriation of the finite for reason. This is 
what distinguishes Hegelianism from an idealism 
that opposes the pure idea to the pure matter of 
the world, turning both into unreal abstractions.1 2 
Hegel’s idealism is absolute, not because it re­
jects finitude absolutely, but because, on the con­
trary, it claims to encompass, to account for 
transcendentally particularity entirely in all its 
dimensions, because it comprehends the totality 
of experience as rational from the standpoint of 
identity. The reality of the finite is not destroyed 
in this way, but affirmed. Hegel is, as Findlay 
has put it, «more nearly a dialectical materialist 
than most Hegelians have realised».3
But this cannot be made to mean that He­
gelianism is dialectical materialism tout court, in 
the manner of the extreme reductionists. The 
movement for the total appropriation of finitude 
remains an original impulse within thought. The 
system is the expression of the will to self­
opposition and self-recovery in the form of self­
transparency internal to the transcendental unity. 
In this manner the latter is personalised, and this 
is what «Geist» denotes. The notion of a cosmos 
permeated by a personal dynamic in pursuit of 
self-knowledge' in every aspect of empirical reality 
grounds the task of synthesis. .
6. the mortality of the finite
The circle of the Spirit’s descent into and self­
recovery from finitude provides the key to 
Hegel’s notion of the essential mortality of the fi­
nite, which Kojève employed extensively for the 
purposes of the objectivistic reduction.
According to Kojève, Hegel conceives philos­
ophy as a superstructure determined by historical 
existence whose content is struggle and labour. 
But empirical reality is permeated by the pres­
ence of death and the consciousness of that ines­
capable destiny. It is not only a natural series of 
human generations, but also a process of forms of 
life negating themselves by giving birth to
1. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
2. Cf. critique of Kant’s and Fichte’s idealism in PhG, pp. 
272-280.
3. Findlay, op cit., p. 14.
superior ones equally transient*. Moreover, the 
end of history is the death of historical man. 
Hence, Hegel’s affirmation of the essential mor­
tality of the finite implies acceptance of the real­
ity of death as the ultimate fact and limit for all 
life and consciousness.4
Kojève’s familiar one-sidedness is once again 
manifested in these assertions. Hegel does 
describe the finite as mortal.5 But he 
also affirms, inherent in that very same finite, 
a tendency of self-transcendence into infin­
ity and immortality.6 This on account of a tran­
scendental placement of the finite within the 
overall ideal totality which is the ground of its 
empirical existence. As always in Hegel, the em­
phasis on mortality should not obliterate correla­
tive immortality, negativity cannot be posited 
without positivity. Both poles manifest themselves 
as interlocking tendencies within the same being. 
And the entire process of the finite’s self-negation 
culminates in a positive victory of the eternal 
over the transient, within thought.7
That the finite is mortal is the other side of the 
proposition we analysed earlier stating the «all 
philosophy is idealism». But this expressly asserts 
that tangible, empirical finitude cannot be ac­
cepted as the ultimate ground of all truth. There 
can be no knowledge if we choose as foundation 
the «This» of passive receptivity proposed by 
naive, natural consciousness. On such primacy of 
the immediate given only Doxa, relativistic soph­
ism can be erected. This central Platonic argu­
ment, forcefully developed especially in the 
Theaetetus, is accepted by Hegel in its entirety. 
His strategy for going beyond the debilitating 
stranglehold of Doxa expounded in the opening 
chapters of the PhG is premissed on it.8
The «This» must be taken up into some con­
ceptual framework, can be pinpointed only 
through the mediation of a firm a priori scheme. 
Hence it «dies» qua false pretension to constitute 
absolute truth. But this death is not am external 
catastrophe inflicted upon natural consciousness 
and its object by alien forces. It is experienced 
by that consciousness itself, as the inner neces­
sity of its own life situation and of its object’s 
own movement. The finite becomes infinite when 
consciousness rises to awareness of a universal 
interconnection that «makes sense» out of a 
fragmented empirical universe. This dynamic ra­
tional structuring of reality is the infinity of the
4. Kojève, op. cit., p. 389.
5. Flegel, Logic, voi. I, pp. 125-149.
6. Ibid., pp. 149-174.
7. Compare Kelly, op cit., pp.313-322. Also Grégoire, op. 
cit., footnote 4, pp. 69-70.
8. PhG, 149-160.
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finite. Yet it is no «grâce» conferred on it by an 
alien transcendent substance, but appears as a 
tendency of self-infinitisation in the life of the fi­
nite itself. The a priori scheme is no generalisa­
tion based on empirical observation, but it is in­
valid if it cannot render experience coherent for 
finite consciousness itself.
These arguments in Hegel prove the opposite of 
what Kojève claims: by establishing the essential 
mortality of the finite Hegel is not at all asserting 
that transient empirical existence is the ultimate 
fact on which philosophy must be based. Quite to 
the contrary, Mortality is a metaphysical state­
ment about the inherent tendencies of self- 
infinitisation in the finite. It points to the neces­
sity of approaching finitude from the standpoint 
of a larger rational whole, the necessity of its 
«death» qua radically self-sufficient donné. Along 
with the recognition of negativity and mortality in 
the heart of finite being, there goes the affirma­
tion of (philosophical) immortality, the positive 
supersession of fragmentation on the empirical 
level by means of a synthesis in thought. This 
constitutes the salvation of the phenomenon, its 
resurrection in the eternity of reason. It is the 
only possible consistent proof of its reality, not as 
contingent materiality posing as absolute, but as a 
moment in and for self-consciousness.
Hegel launches a frontal attack on the reality of 
death on its own level, not because he wishes to 
acknowledge death’s definitive dominion in life 
and thought. He feels, on the contrary, that the 
only secure way to overcome it is not by pretend­
ing it does not exist, but by recognising its great 
power as the decisive challenge.1 Christ was only 
able to triumph over death by submitting to its 
harsh discipline. After Spirit’s death, its self- 
abandonment to finitude, there is always resurrec­
tion, but, equally, spiritual fusion with the eternal 
comes only as a consequence of the ordeal by 
death. «Χριστός άνέστη έκ νεκρών θανάτψ θάνα­
τον πατήσας.» Once again Hegel’s inspiration can 
be traced back to the Christian dogmas, although 
his own version of immortality introduces sig­
nificant modifications.1 2
The positive supersession of finitude in the 
non-transcendent etemality of Science cannot, 
therefore, be said to install a material substratum 
as the infrastructure to an a posteriori theory. 
This would attribute to Hegel a view of History 
as permanent negation, pure transience, free crea­
tion without perceptible structure. If science is a 
posteriori and history-in-nature the ultimate ir­
1. Ibid., p. 93.
2. On Hegel and immortality cf. Grégoire, op. cit., pp.
179-184.
reducible fact,3 then the former is determined by 
the latter. But for Hegel philosophy’s «only» pre­
supposition of reason in history does arrange the 
material into a definite pattern of more or less 
secularised theodicy or eschatology.4
There is a positive supersession of negativity in 
history through an absolute that is eternally pres­
ent. Each finite moment is transcended into eter- 
nality, while, conversely, the eternal cannot but 
exist as concentrated in the finite moment as if in 
a single focus. Death cannot be ultimate, history 
is no mere «slaughterbench», on which human 
ideals and strivings are reduced to nothingness.5 
The sparks Of immortality glow in time, the pres­
ent is eternal, the tangible end of time in time is 
accomplished through the principles of absolute 
idealism.6·
The great inner tension of the reduction is that 
Kojève, as a conscientious student of Hegel, can­
not avoid referring to the speculative satisfaction 
in Science as the proper culmination of Hegel’s 
spiritual anabasis. In Kojève’s own account, 
alongside the determining dialectic of «Struggle 
and Labour», the historical process is also gov­
erned by the necessity for a universal diffusion of 
the light of rational self-consciousness, subjugating 
to the exigencies of spiritual transparency all 
aspects of reality.7 The telos of history is Sci­
ence as pure contemplation, the mental move­
ment which is the non-movement or repetition 
in memory of the steps that have led to the abo­
lition of history, or the recollection of history 
dead and gone.8 Death is not only the ultimate 
content of historical existence, but the death of 
history as such is the outcome of the temporal 
process.
Here Kojève involves himself in a harsh vicious 
circle. His account up to this point has insisted 
on determination by Labour. But now the stun­
ning assertion is made that for Hegel the goal of 
history is the death of the category «historical 
labouring man» through that very science which 
has been presented all along as a mere reflection 
of Labour’s reality. Now labour instead of deter­
mining speculation, is all of a sudden absolutely 
and definitively determined or killed by the latter! 
Of course Kojève’s Hegel is not advocating the 
extinction of the human species. Science is the 
abolition of labour and struggle, while man con­
tinues to lead a non-historical purely biological
3. Kojève, op. cit., p. 434.
4. Hegel, Philosophy of History, pp. 9, 15. Also K. 
Loewith, From Hegel to Nietische, N.Y., 1967, pp. 29-49.
5. Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 21.
6- Hegel, PhG, p. 800.
7. Kojève, op. cit., p. 302.
8. Ibid., pp. 387, 411.
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existence. It is the restoration of Aristotle’s 
«biological time».1 But the question still remains: 
how can this abolition be caused in a medium, 
which up to this point was considered a mere 
superstructure to the reality it now absolutely 
determines?
This is a strange contradiction. For one thing, 
the truth of spirit is said to be, in good non­
metaphysical manner, finite human subjects 
struggling for survival by material labour, 
rationalising their existence in ideologies that in­
vert actual relations of production and project 
into an ideal realm humanity’s own alienated es­
sence. For another, the telos of this process is 
the abolition of labour in history through specula­
tion, i.e. the destruction of spirit’s own truth. 
Spirit is the reality and thought of labour and 
struggle in history. And yet, the inner dynamic 
and destiny of spirit is to destroy its own very 
truth and life. This suicide of Spirit is then sup­
posed to be recognised by a Spirit, which by now 
does not even exist any more, as its highest ful­
filment, absolute satisfaction and perfect self­
transparency !
But Flegel could not have argued for any self- 
inflicted death of Spirit or Infinity; on the con­
trary, he proved the necessary self-transcendence 
of the finite, because knowledge cannot be 
founded on it. He demanded the suicide of the 
finite into ideality, as it realises the harsh con­
tradictoriness of its life in limitation. Not because 
he celebrated death as an ultimate, but because 
he demanded a higher life. Forfeiting a lower kind 
of natural existence, empirical consciousness re­
discovers itself as infinite in the bosom of present 
eternity, immortal in thought.
Kojève does not lack awareness, which he 
chooses to supress, that Hegel’s is not a social 
but a speculative argument. It presupposes the 
logical a priori of identity, and the aggressive, ir­
resistibly imperialistic tendencies of conscious­
ness. Total diffusion of the light of dialectical 
reason is the law of a prearranged structure in 
history. Kojève éxpressed it quite succinctly: for 
Hegel, history is the history of philosophy.1 2 If 
the finite is true only via its participation in ideal­
ity, how can it be the source of all truth? If his­
tory is the history of philosophy, how can it be 
simultaneously conceived as the history of 
labour?
If Kojève means that history is the history of a 
philosophy, which in turn is only a reflection of 
material labour how can we conceive of this his­
tory as bounded by a telos that is the production
1. Ibid., p. 435.
2. Ibid., pp. 391, 397.
in philosophy and in history of their own death?
No. In Hegel labour must be for consciousness 
and not consciousness for labour. Labour is a 
tool of speculation, one of the concrete manifesta­
tions of Trennung, as perceived by consciousness 
on its highway of despair.3
It is self-evident that from the moment Hegel 
decides to introduce into the essence of Spirit 
movement by self-opposition, to personalise the 
absolute, he is bound to confer on the moment of 
praxis centr'al significance. But this elevation of 
praxis into the cardinal moment in reason is ini­
tially an abstract, a priori operation.
The abstract category will, of course, have to 
descend to the concrete level and there manifest 
itself as a particular Gestalt. In the words of R. 
Kroner, the a priori must a-posteriorise itself. 
And yet, we must repeat, the demand for 
a-posteriorisation is inbuilt into Hegel’s idealism, 
and does not imply theory construction on obser­
vation of empirical facts. The abstract category of 
Negation, Entzweiung, Activity abandon their 
closed isolation and enter catégorial realms of a 
lower order (social praxis) to generate related but 
derivative categories.4 Labour is one of these de­
rivative moments, one Shape in the pedagogy of 
phenomenal consciousness. Labour is only a 
species of the genus Division, as established by 
abstract ontology, to use G. A. Kelly’s expres­
sion.5
Kojève refuses to draw these necessary conclu­
sions from the teleology of speculation he himself 
discerns in Hegelian history. He does not wish to 
grant the non-reducible autonomy, if not outright 
hypostatisation of the element of thought within 
the subject-object synthesis, not in disjunction 
from, but in history, its own history. But is it not 
true that even if we concede the most radical 
humanistic reduction, identifying philosophy with 
one man of flesh and blood, Hegel, or, to follow 
Kojève, with one material thing, the Book6 con­
taining its principles, then again it is thought 
which is thereby hypostatised, in so far as this 
ultimate reduction does not celebrate Hegel’s con­
tingent empirical existence, or the material of 
which the Book is made, wood, paper, etc., but 
the universal rational principles in Hegel’s mind 
or printed in the Book, the absolute Power which 
produced them in order to render the inner struc­
ture of the όντως ον transparent to human under­
standing. This is, after all, the meaning of the 
«end of history» signalled by absolute idealism. It
3. Loewith, op. cit., pp. 262-267.
4. Hartmann, op. cit, pp. 118-121.
5. Kelly, op. cit., p. 333.
6. Kojève, op. cit., p. 384.
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implies that the rational tools have now been 
forged through which a perfect comprehension of 
man’s spiritual vocation has been made possible 
for all time, for as long as there is empirical his­
tory. Because there will be, of course, empirical 
history after Hegel.1 To make Hegel’s thought 
the agent of this world-historical consummation, 
does it not imply to precisely de-humanise him, 
attribute to him super-human, super-natural, di­
vine qualities, qua participant in the intelligible 
current of Reason exposed as energising the 
cosmos?
The divine νόησις νοήσεως, which, in any cir­
cumstance, is the culmination of Hegelian history, 
cannot be thought of, on the assumption of the 
dialecticity of history, as a sudden catastrophic 
birth ex nihilo, negating in one moment a whole 
past process (material labour) that has been radi­
cally different from it. Only if history and the ob­
jective moment it contains are subjected to the 
discipline of a rational teleology, can Science as 
contemplation be accepted as the eschaton with­
out contradiction.
7. master and slave
Finally, since Kojève’s reduction is based on 
an ingenious analysis of «Master and Slave» in 
the PhG, we must briefly discuss the bias it in­
troduces even into this, one of the most social 
moments of the process.
This confrontation is a division within con­
sciousness itself manifested as a social category.1 2 
It is a diremption of its original unity to expedite 
the ascent to the higher level of rational self- 
consciousness. It is induced by an internal re­
quirement of thought: the vicious circle of animal 
desire that cannot accomodate awareness of 
human freedom must be broken. Desire is total 
dependence on external nature providing material 
for a temporary satisfaction of biological need. 
But after a brief interval the pre-existing void is 
restored.3 The animal assimilation of nature 
(Verdauung) is a false conquest of externality, a 
pseudo-activity within the confines of total passiv­
ity vis-a-vis matter. But man is also carrier of a 
fundamental creative impulse that must be al­
lowed full scope as a determining principle. This 
cannot be achieved under the domination of materi­
al necessity. Consciousness must defeat material­
1. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 319, 320.
2. Cf. a mediation between the inner and outer diremption 
in G. A. Kelly’s «Notes on Lordship and Bondage», in Hegel, 
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. MacIntyre, pp. 189-217. 
Also Hegel, PhG, pp. 219-220, 224.
3. Ibid., pp. 221, 225.
ity. And only an explosive confrontation of two 
Desires, or the appearance of human conscious­
ness broken up into two mutually repelling en­
tities, creates preconditions for an eventual 
affirmation of man’s ideal vocation, of free forma­
tive activity.4 This is the properly «anthropogen­
ic» framework.
Consequently, Hegel is not here describing the 
empirical beginnings of human society. It is not 
historical evidence which dictates the introduction 
at this point of a duel for the pure prestige of 
recognition by another desire, in which the yoke 
of the finite is broken and man accedes to a first 
consciousness of his freedom.
This does not imply that the master-slave image 
could not have been suggested by a study of cer­
tain periods of history, but, despite empirical ref­
erences, it is here employed not for a historical 
but for a speculative purpose, within the ideal 
scheme of egogenesis, whose essence is the sup­
pression of the tyranny of empeiria in perfect and 
eternal knowledge.5
The slave-owning world of antiquity may have 
been socially stratified, but Hegel’s non-empirical 
approach made him indifferent to the actual func­
tioning of his beloved Polis as a concrete social 
mechanism. In any case, duels for pure prestige 
causing stratification, as in the PhG, are not to be 
detected there empirically.
It is significant that Hegel’s source of inspira­
tion in this connection is itself an idealised recon­
struction of a certain phase of antiquity: the 
Homeric poems do depict a Weltzustand* of he­
roes clashing in defense of personal τιμή. They 
are an ex post recreation of historical events that 
inverts causal chains, despite the wealth of fac­
tual information they contain, hypostatising hu­
man forces into active ideal elements. The Trojan 
war for instance did take place, but not because 
Helen was abducted. True to his bias, Hegel ac­
cepts the idealistic inversion at face value as the 
actual social content of protohistory. Moreover, 
he redoubles the idealistic distortion when he 
utilises Homeric mythology for the a priori pur­
poses of his scheme for consciousness. We find 
here a direct parallel to the handling of the 
Antigone,6 from which the content of «Sittlich­
keit» in the PhG is directly deduced.
The slave-owning world is an immediately given 
class structure. If thought limits itself to this 
«fact» the most it can aspire to is an exhaustive 
description of its constituent elements. But the 
mystery of its necessity is not thereby penetrated,
4. Ibid., p. 226.
5. Ibid., pp. 227, 228.
6. See above, ch. 3.
* World condition.
98
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 02:52:57 |
some problems in a left-Hegelian reading of Hegel
because for Hegel logical cause is not identical 
with empirical origin.1 The rational concept 
«saves» the phenomena for thought. The function 
of the ideal duel is precisely to save for con­
sciousness the reality of a world divided into 
masters and slaves.
It is only in this light that we can comprehend 
why death of one or both participants, an inher­
ent probability in any duel, does not provide a 
genuine resolution; why, even if the path of con­
sciousness is lined with corpses of countless 
Eteocleses and Polyniceses, death is not allowed 
to arrest reason before it inundates the universe.
The confrontation is predicated on a double re­
quirement: on the one hand, both opponents must 
risk life for the ideal of recognition, but simul­
taneously animality must be preserved as a mo­
ment in the resultant synthesis, because self- 
consciousness cannot exist without a biological 
substratum.1 2 Hence, the outcome is destined to 
be a living unity, ultimately expressed as a rela­
tion of class domination, rising above the abstract 
immediacy of decomposing being (death).
These conditions cannot be successfully fused a 
posteriori, through observation of class relations 
as they existed in Hegel’s time or in the Greco- 
Roman world. The moment of Life is indeed pre­
served in contemporary experience, Hegel’s and 
ours, but in a wholly non-ideal way. Natural exis­
tence is not being gambled for ideal ends, and it 
was not in the past either, with any necessity. 
The chance individual gamblers of mythical and 
historical accounts strike the imagination of brut­
alised and impotent masses of self-seeking bour­
geois and starved (physically and spiritually) 
proletarians as supernatural beings, Demigods, 
Heroes or Saints. The social landscape is com­
posed of desperate clashes among deprived indi­
viduals for scarce resources. Life is preserved, 
therefore, precisely in the animal, raw, unre­
flected manner that Hegel was striving to over­
come. Empirical reality is an explosive mixture of 
rare idealism, which everyone hypocritically pro­
fesses to admire, and a frenetic egotism, an un­
thinking, impulsive rush to maintain a vegetating 
existence, to which higher aspirations are like 
poison, solely for the sake of maintaining it.3
If philosophy elects to theorise about this state 
of affairs by means of empirical induction, then it 
is in the final analysis elevating an alienated real­
ity to the status of a natural and eternal 
«condition humaine». This would inevitably gen­
1. Cf. paragraph 3, PhR.
2. Kojève, op. cit., p. 53.
3. For Hegel’s awareness of the bleak reality of emerging
capitalism, cf. paragraphs 189-208 in PhR.
erate quietistic resignation to the eclipse of ideals, 
idealism and sacrifice for higher ends, in the face 
of the onslaught of the «homo oeconomicus» and 
his materialistic cravings.
Hegel, no less than Marx after him, will refuse 
to endorse a society, or a theory, based on as­
sumptions of self-seeking individualism as the ul­
timate motivation in human life.4 The devices of 
rationalisation, and hence the pair of ideal com­
batants, must transcend experience. They found 
its possibility as a rational system. But this can­
not occur, unless, in our case, the duel is re­
solved in a particular way. The first obstacle is 
death, a destructive pseudo-resolution, which 
freezes the dialectic before the «new world» of 
thought, whose dawn we are witnessing,5 can 
come to maturity and fruition.
But, even if an empirical pair of primitive indi­
viduals, duelling presumably for control over 
material means of subsistence, is assumed, the 
possibility of death cannot be excluded a poste­
riori, because empeiria, segregated from the op­
eration of rational law, is the realm of pure ab­
stract possibility, where everything may occur. 
Empirical reasoning cannot ascertain with any de­
gree of necessity that, despite the fact of death 
terminating the struggle of the first pair, and 
countless pairs after it, there must come a mo­
ment of living subjugation, ushering in a higher 
stage. Any transition whatsoever may and then 
may not take place under these circumstances. 
And if we still insist on following the empirical 
route and simultaneously assert the necessity of 
this transition (masters vs. slaves), then appeal 
must be made to chance.
No logical necessity for the Aufhebung of ani­
mal life into a class relationship and the avoid­
ance of the pseudo-resolution of death can be ex­
pected a posteriori. Within the constraints of the 
empirical method the ascent to rational self- 
consciousness remains a mystery and must be ac­
cepted on faith. This a priori elimination of the 
possibility of consciousness succumbing to death, 
especially in a situation where death might be 
said from an empirical standpoint to be a govern­
ing factor, is the reflection on the phenomenolog­
ical level of Hegel’s metaphysical position ana­
lysed earlier, namely that mortality is not the 
final limit in human existence.
The ideal character of the duel image is posi­
tively expressed in a spiritual context for the con­
flict. Two sides of consciousness are pitted
4. Cf. Hegel’s evaluation of classical economics as the ad­
mirable science of the «external state» of Vestand, PhR, pp. 
343-6.
5. Hegel, PhG, p.75.
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against each other for the ideal of recognition. 
The disintegration of the original unity has to be 
followed by integrity restored, a second stage of 
reconciliation, identification of the opposites. This 
is the recognition of the implicit similarity of the 
two combatants qua spiritual beings. Thus, an in­
ternal dynamic of consciousness determines the 
outcome. The nature of this determination im­
poses as the object of the struggle not command 
over material resources, security of life of social 
position, although all these may and do accrue to 
the victor; the object of human desire can be no 
other than human desire itself, to be human is to 
be desired by another human being.1 And this is 
an ideal demand par excellence.
This atmosphere of «pure prestige» is not rec­
ognised by Kojève, although again he cannot 
avoid referring to it, as the ideal ether sustaining 
the combatants. More often than not his reduc­
tion to «Lutte et Travail» boils down to an em­
phasis on «Travail» tout court, while the «Lutte» 
component in which the ideal element resides is 
neglected. This introduces further bias. As we 
saw, in Hegel’s metaphysics the level of experi­
ence is not primary, but ideally founded, although 
qua moment indispensable. In this derivative, 
posited—yet necessary in the absolute—sphere, 
Labour in «Master and Slave» performs clearly 
one of the significant mediations in the inversion, 
and does not of itself constitute the entirety of 
the movement. Labour is expressly depicted as 
operative only within the environment of the fear 
of death.1 2
The fear of death is the concrete psychological 
environment engulfing the slave’s labour, the only 
medium in which under conditions of formative 
activity ascent to an abstract grasp of universal­
ity, a first consciousness of freedom is possible. 
Death is not to arrest the march of spirit, but this 
is evident only from the higher standpoint of 
dialectical criticism. From the side of the par­
ticipants in the struggle it remains a possibility, 
and hence fear has a tangible reality.
The total dissolution of the slave’s being in 
fear, as it was he who succumbed to the threat of 
natural death, is not, according to by now famil­
iar procedure, allowed to cause an imaginable re­
1. PhG, p. 226. For Kojève, op. cit. p. 15, the clash oc­
curs under no conditions of predestination, each of the com­
batants is radically free in his choice of stance vis-a-vis ani­
mality. But this «existentialist» slant (cf. R. Zimmerman, 
Kojève’s Hegel, Sarah Lawrence, p. 13) is out of place, be­
cause although no predetermination selects precisely who will 
become master and who slave, the duel as a whole is under 
the discipline of an ideal necessity for reconciliation, as these 
passages from the PhG show, in so far as subjugation-in-life is 
an apriori destiny.
2. Hegel, PhG, p. 237.
turn to a purely destructive inertia of spiritual de­
composition. The fearful fluidity of self-negation 
must be positively transcended, it is the vehicle 
of a superior satisfaction in a first recognition of 
humanity by the slave in himself.3 The redeem­
ing effect of service is achieved under the impact 
of absolute fear, yet once again disintegration 
leads to a higher reconstitution.
Fear is negative total dissolution, an ideal agent 
in so far as it abstracts from fixed determination, 
sets the slave’s psyche in motion on the road to 
self-transcendence. Without fear of the «sovereign 
master», liquefaction of feelings and concepts in 
the face of non-existence labour remains petty 
«technique» that does not challenge domination in 
general, a mere piece of cleverness which, by 
mildly questioning side-effects, is basically affirm­
ing the overall legitimacy of the slave’s existential 
limitation.4
Of course, it remains true that higher crystalli­
sations of freedom cannot originate with fear 
alone. Without service, fear remains mute, unex­
pressed potentiality for humanity.5 Labour is the 
real, objectifying factor. Only in labour does the 
dissolved personality congeal into a new self- 
identity based on creativity that thrusts the sub­
ject beyond nature’s gravity.
It is within this dialectical unification of fear 
and Labour, in the Bildung of the slave that the 
contradictions bringing about the inversion ex­
plode. It is, therefore, hard to justify tearing labour 
away from the context of unity with its ideal 
background, in order to affirm it in its abstract 
materiality as the key to the Aufhebung in 
«Master and Slave», let alone to the Hegelian 
synthesis as a whole.
Contrary to that procedure, and keeping in 
mind the inner necessity of consciousness govern­
ing the selection of stages of its own itinerary 
(here dictating a duel of pure prestige as the 
means to soar beyond finitude), we must con­
clude that:
although (a) it is impermissible to break up the 
unity and ascribe causation to the ideal ele­
ment of fear, or to the material element of 
labour, in abstraction from their living relation 
to one another;
it is, nevertheless, true that (b) within the in­
dissoluble untity there is a relative priority of 
the ideal. This general metaphysical rule in 
Hegel is expressed in this particular shape of 
experience as the atmosphere of fear within 
which the material factor must operate.
For, after all, fear without labour as «mute» po-
3. Ibid., p. 238.
4. Ibid., pp. 239-240.
5. Ibid., p. 239.
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tentiality for freedom is still a category quite dig­
nified philosophically, possessing of right a cer­
tain rank in a dialectical scheme.1 But labour 
without fear, degenerating into «petty technique», 
is something totally trivial, non-spiritual, animal 
play with dead matter that deserves only con­
tempt.
8. conclusion
This paper has tried to explore the Hegelian 
synthesis synoptically, as the only valid stand­
point for interpretation. The effort seemed to es­
tablish an internal balance on the basis of a rela­
tive priority of the ideal moment.
Any attempt to dismember Hegel’s unity by 
setting up one of the terms as the irreducible pre­
supposition of the rest, especially if the one ab- 
solutised is objectivity in the manner of Kojève, 
must be seen as the founding of a new, and quite 
conceivably more satisfactory interpretation of 
man in the universe, definitely inspired by Hegel, 
yet clearly deviating from his genuine inspiration. 
For Hegel did claim after all to have made God 
transparent to human reason, but, with all the 
ambiguity of this statement, there is no explicit 
reference to class struggle as the base of religion 
and philosophy, or to classless society as the goal 
of history. And it seems very risky to formulate a 
striking new interpretation on the basis of what
1. See discussion of «formal possibility», which «allows 
everything that does not contradict itself» in an abstract sub­
jective sense in Logik, vol. II, pp. 203-204.
Hegel meant to say2 by looking behind the mis­
leading «metaphysical connotations» of his 
terminology.3 It would be absurd to deny that 
Hegel was aware of these metaphysical 
«distortions». Why then was he so deliberate 
about them? Would he have been so keen on 
their use, if they were creating such a totally per­
verse idea in people’s minds about what he really 
meant to say?
In any event, let me state the obvious that this 
critique of the humanist reduction does not au­
tomatically establish the validity of the metaphys­
ical argument in all its ramifications.4
More importantly, it does in no way imply an 
adverse judgement on Kojève’s enterprise, as an 
attempt to resolve, by reference to Hegel, modern 
existentialism and phenomenology, and Marxism, 
the dilemmas of the twentieth century predica­
ment.5
Kojève’s exegesis is not the definitive rendering 
of Hegel’s genuine motivation; but, viewed in the 
interwar European context, especially as the 
brutal impact of the ossification of «official» 
Marxism, amidst the hecatombs of its victims, 
threw the intellectuals of the period totally off 
balance, deserves the deepest respect, not only 
for its brilliance, but also for its burning passion.
But its appreciation in that light is a wholly dif­
ferent question.
2. Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
3. See note 7, ch. 2.
4. For an important discussion of the whole range of inter­
pretative alternatives see Grégoire, op. cit., pp. 140-219.
5. Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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